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Strategies to help the one billion people worldwide who live in informal 
settlements have mainly focused on slum upgrading, sites and services 
programs and tenure security. In contrast, there has been less attention on 
what enables slum dwellers to transition into the formal housing sector, 
which has the dual benefits of improving service access and escaping 
social stigma. In this paper we investigate residential mobility among slum 
dwellers in Bhopal, India. Our analysis shows that one in five households 
succeeds in getting out of a slum settlement, and a major determinant is 
the household’s ability to save on a regular basis. Due to limited outreach 
of institutional housing finance, most slum dwellers rely solely on 
household savings for purchasing a house. These findings underscore the 
urgent need to improve savings instruments for slum dwellers and to 
downmarket housing finance to reach the poorest residents of rapidly 
growing cities in developing countries. 
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Household savings and residential mobility  
in informal settlements 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
An estimated one-third of all urban residents live in informal settlements or slums—the 
vast majority in developing countries. Conditions in such areas vary widely from dismal, 
temporary shelter in squatter settlements to relatively well-constructed, informal housing 
that may persist for many decades. Common characteristics include uncertain tenure 
status, poor basic services such as water and sanitation, low-grade construction and 
overcrowded living conditions. Apart from physical deprivation, slum dwellers also often 
face more subtle disadvantages such as poor integration with the rest of the city and the 
social stigma attached to an inferior residential location.  
With continuing rapid growth of urban areas, improving the life of slum dwellers 
is high on the agenda of national governments and the international community. The 
Millennium Development Goals, for instance, advocate significant improvements in the 
lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020 (United Nations 2005). Over the last 
several decades, strategies to achieve better living conditions of slum dwellers have 
included sites and services programs, resettlement to new housing developments, and 
land titling. We will not discuss the merits of these strategies in detail in this paper. Each 
strategy has had its share of success stories and failures. Given the scale of the problem, 
we argue instead that all available options need to be at the disposal of policy makers and   2 
adapted to local conditions, including strategies that enable slum dwellers to leave 
informal settlements. This is the focus of this paper in which we investigate what enables 
people to move out of a slum area into the formal housing market. 
For many households, slum areas are not just temporary residences, but are homes 
for many decades. Yet, some residents manage to move out into the formal housing 
market. The main question in this paper is why some households manage to use the 
informal housing market as a stepping stone towards improved housing, while for others, 
slums essentially become poverty traps. More specifically, in this paper we investigate 
the determinants of residential mobility in Bhopal, India, using a comprehensive 
household level data set. We are particularly interested in the personal and household 
characteristics that enable slum dwellers to graduate to formal housing categories—in our 
survey sample, one in five households succeeds in getting out of a slum settlement. We 
find that in the absence of formal housing finance options, the ability of households to 
accumulate savings significantly improves their chances for moving out of slums.  
In the following section we briefly review policies to address the problem of 
inadequate shelter in developing country cities and present descriptive results from an 
urban household survey in Bhopal, India. Following that we discuss the role of savings in 
housing mobility in Section 3. Section 4 presents the analytical approach, followed by the 
empirical results of our analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
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2.  Housing mobility 
 
Rapid urban population growth and the inability of local governments to provide 
sufficient serviced land has resulted in a large number of people residing in informal 
settlements in the developing world. Globally, almost one billion people live in slums 
according to UN estimates (United Nations 2003). To address this problem, development 
agencies and national governments have supported a range of shelter related programs 
(Werlin 1999, Sivam and Karuppannan 2002; Mukhija 2002; Buckley and Kalarickal 
2004). Initially, policies favored sites and services programs where infrastructure could 
be provided relatively cheaply on newly developed land. In Indian cities, most settlement 
sites were at the urban periphery, where the cost of network services extension is 
considerable and commuting to urban jobs expensive. Resettlement programs were 
managed within relatively low budgets by providing a low level of services. With the 
persistence of large slum areas and the realization that many slums could not be simply 
removed, urban upgrading projects became more widespread. Retrofitting existing 
settlements with better services is usually more expensive, but it avoids the social 
disruption of moving residents into new greenfield developments.  
The question of resettlement versus in-situ upgrading raises a dilemma. Moving 
slum dwellers to new housing in other parts of the city can destroy the social networks on 
which slum dwellers rely for income and other support. Even if entire communities get 
moved, residents may lose their access to jobs and services that were available in the old, 
often more centrally located informal settlement. With slum upgrading, on the other 
hand, service quality may be improved, but the social stigma attached to living in a slum   4 
location remains, even after living conditions have improved. Perlman (2003) provides 
evidence from slums in Rio de Janeiro to suggest that the stigma of having a residential 
address in a squatter settlement has adverse consequences on the probability of getting a 
job. There is also a growing body of analytic work showing that neighborhood attributes 
may affect economic and social outcomes through the behaviors, attitudes or 
characteristics of others who live within the same area. Examples are the ability of 
neighbors to provide job referrals or peer group effects on educational performance of 
children. 
Therefore, in addition to such direct interventions, there needs to be a 
consideration of processes that may lead to a more natural conversion or transition from 
slums into the formal housing markets. Providing tenure security allows residents to use 
housing as collateral for investment in their dwelling unit or in economic activities. 
Titling activities can have well-documented beneficial effects (e.g., Lanjouw and Levy
 
2002, Field and Torero 2002, Field 2003). But they tend to be costly, are subject to 
lengthy legal challenges, may encourage selling out to better off residents, and often 
reward those who illegally occupied land owned by the state or others. Development 
agencies therefore often shy away from full-scale land titling projects. Housing policy 
reform can help overcome housing supply constraints by removing burdensome and 
ineffective barriers to housing investment. This includes regulatory reform such as 
removal of floor-area ratios and financial sector restructuring (Diamond 2000; Bertaud, 
Buckley and Owens 2003; Bertaud and Bruckner 2004). Such reform may lead to lower 
housing prices and greater affordability, making formal dwellings accessible to lower 
income residents.   5 
To complement policy development aimed at direct intervention and regulatory 
reform, it is equally important to understand how people manage to transition from slums 
into the formal housing market in the absence of targeted policies or projects. This paper 
identifies characteristics of slum dwellers who manage to move out of informal 
settlements and discusses policies that may support this transition. Among these factors 
we specifically consider the role of savings.  
Our empirical analysis is based on a detailed, multi-purpose household survey of 
residents in the city of Bhopal in the central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. The survey 
of 2508 households was conducted between August and October 2003 and is designed to 
be representative of the Bhopal Municipal Corporation area across all welfare and 
housing categories. Approximate household locations were captured using global 
positioning systems receivers. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the sample in the Bhopal 
municipal area. The survey includes questions on welfare status, housing quality, tenure 
status and mobility, education attainment, skill levels, savings behavior, and asset 
holdings, as well as questions on quality of access to infrastructure services. 
   6 
Figure 1: Geographic distribution of sample households within municipal wards 
 
 
The Indian housing market can be classified into several broad segments: an 
informal market, composed of dwelling units in squatter settlements, but also including 
resettlement layouts and unauthorized layouts; and a formal market, composed of 
publicly produced housing units and private developers. Although the focus of our study 
is on a comparison of slums versus more formal housing, these categorizations hide 
considerable heterogeneity in the structural and regulatory characteristics of different 
types of housing supply mechanisms that are common to most Indian cities (see also, e.g., 
Sivam 2002, 2003). Table 1 shows the distribution of our sample across housing 
categories encountered in Bhopal. About 30 percent live in notified and non-notified 
slum and squatter settlements. Although squatter settlements are spontaneous   7 
developments to start with, their consolidation is driven by organized groups of land-
grabbers. While squatter housing may be initially developed by households on open 
lands in close proximity to employment centers, these settlements get consolidated by 
groups who construct dwellings for sale and rental purposes. 






1  Non-notified squatter settlement  221  8.8 
2  Notified squatter settlement  519  20.7 
3  Resettlement area  80  3.2 
4  Unauthorized colony  184  7.3 
5  BDA/MPHB plots  122  4.9 
6  BDA/MPHB flats  132  5.3 
7  Cooperative housing  85  3.4 
8  Employer housing  357  14.2 
9  Private builder's / colonies  306  12.2 
10  Core/historical city area  502  20.0 
  Total  2508  100.0 
Source: Bhopal Urban Household Survey 2003 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of welfare levels across households in six broad 
housing categories, where the welfare measure is per capita annual household 
consumption in Rupees. There is significant variance within each housing category with 
households in slums having the lowest consumption expenditures. 
   8 
Figure 2: Distribution of household welfare levels by housing category 
 
Source: Bhopal Urban Household Survey 2003; housing categories: slums (1&2), resettlement areas (3), 
unauthorized colonies (4), public housing (5,6,7&8), private housing (9) and historic core (10), see Table 1. 
 
For many of these slum residents, informal settlements are by no means 
transitional homes. The average length of residence in a slum in our sample is about 21 
years (Figure 3). Some households have lived in the same slum dwelling for more than 
two generations. In addition to information about the current dwelling unit, we also have 
some indication of housing history. Residents were asked about the type of housing, 
tenure status, and access to basic services in their previous residences. From the housing 
history data, we can classify households as having been slum or non-slum dwellers in 
their previous residences if they have moved within the city. Thus, we can identify if 
households have moved out of slums during their residence in Bhopal. The transition 
matrix (Table 2) summarizes the housing history data for the sample households and   9 
shows the extent of spatial mobility out of slums. Overall, 21 percent of slum households 
have moved to improved housing. Almost 80 percent of slum dwellers still live in a slum, 
while about seven percent moved from a non-slum area into a slum area. Note that this 
table only includes moves within Bhopal. We do not include residents who moved to 
Bhopal from other cities and we have no information about those who moved out of 
Bhopal. 
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Table 2: Housing mobility 
   Current Dwelling Unit   
Previous Dwelling Unit  Slum   Non Slum   Total 
Slum   614  165  779 
   78.8  21.2  100.0 
Non Slum   126  1,603  1,729 
   7.3  92.7  100.0 
Total  740  1,768  2,508 
   29.5  70.5  100.0 
Source: Bhopal Household Survey 2003 
Note: Numbers in italics are row percentages 
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Table 3 shows the destination housing categories for slum dwellers who moved 
out. Almost 20 percent moved to private housing (category 9). Eighteen percent moved to 
resettlement areas, 11 percent to unauthorized colonies and about 35 percent to various 
types of publicly provided housing developments. Average duration of stay in a slum for 
those who moved out was 16.5 years. 
Table 3: Destination of slum households who moved to non-slum areas 





3  Resettlement area  30  18.2 
4  Unauthorized colony  18  10.9 
5  BDA/MPHB plots  17  10.3 
6  BDA/MPHB flats  13  7.9 
7  Cooperative housing  5  3.0 
8  Employer housing  23  13.9 
9  Private builder's / colonies  32  19.4 
10  Core/historical city area  27  16.4 
  Total  165  100.0 




3.  Savings behavior and lumpy expenditures 
 
Looking at the distribution in Table 2, we are interested in examining the factors that 
distinguish households who move out of slums from those who do not. An obvious point 
of departure is housing finance in an environment where formal credit tends to be 
accessible only to wealthier households. Apart from informal credit suppliers—
moneylenders, pawnbrokers or friends and relatives—personal savings constitute a large 
proportion of housing finance, particularly for low-income households who are often 
employed in the informal sectors. For four cities in India in the mid 1980s, Lall (1989)   11 
shows that this proportion was higher in smaller towns due to lower overall incomes as 
well as the limited potential for institutional financial support. In Delhi, for instance, 
about 14 % of informal sector households had access to formal housing finance, while in 
two small towns—Cuttack and Quilon—the share was less than seven percent. Own 
savings, in contrast, provided housing finance for between 38% in Lucknow to almost 
95% in Cuttack. 
This situation seems to have changed little in the last 20 years. Even though there 
has been some liberalization and reform in the housing and finance sectors, these 
developments have mostly benefited middle and higher income households (Sivam and 
Karuppannan 2002). This is also reflected in our survey data from Bhopal. We find that 
most of the 1652 sample households who own their dwelling unit had to rely solely on 
personal savings to finance their homes. Access to housing finance is very limited, with 
74 percent of all survey households relying only on own sources for financing their 
homes (Table 4). In addition, 14.5 percent rely on informal non-commercial borrowing to 
finance housing purchases. Similar to Igel and Srinivas (1996), we distinguish informal 
credit by transactional credit suppliers, such as money lenders or pawnbrokers, from 
personal loans from family or other closely related persons who do not charge interest. 
Only 6.4 percent of sample households have used formal housing loans to purchase their 
dwelling units. For current slum dwellers, only 3.1 percent of households who own their 
home have been able to access housing finance from specialized financial institutions 
such as the Housing Development Finance Corporation (HDFC). The situation is slightly 
better for households who have moved out of slums – 5.4 percent have been able to 
access formal housing finance institutions.    12 
 
Table 4: Housing Finance Options (percent) 
Source of finance  All households 
Non slum 
households  Slum households 
       Current  Moved Out 
Home loan (HDFC, 
HUDCO, etc.)  6.4  8.1  3.1  5.4 
Formal loan (without 
collateral)  1.9  2.4  0.6  3.6 
Informal loan / money 
lender  3.3  2.4  5.0  3.6 
Informal borrowing  
(no interest) 
14.5  14.4  13.7  18.8 
 Own Savings  73.9  72.6  77. 6  68.8 
Source: Bhopal Urban Household Survey 2003 
 
One important reason for the failure of financial institutions in down-marketing 
their services to the poor is lack of information. Lack of credit or income related 
information for (mostly) informal sector workers in slums means that lenders require 
collateral, which makes the credit market fail for people without unmovable assets to 
offer. Even with the requisite collateral, limited enforcement of foreclosure laws make 
most financial institutions wary of down-marketing housing finance. Given the limited 
outreach of housing finance institutions, own savings or liquidating other assets therefore 
remains the only option for many households. Housing represents a significant lumpy 
expenditure for most households. This is particularly true for slum dwellers. On average, 
households who moved out of slums paid Rs. 102,000 for their new dwelling units; 
compared to Rs. 163,000 for households who have never been slum dwellers (on average, 
this is about five times the annual per capita consumption estimate).    13 
Personal savings thus present the only way to home ownership for most low-
income households. Among the sample households in Bhopal, almost thirty percent 
manage to save regularly, either through chit fund savings or other forms. The proportion 
is higher in better off households. For instance, among households in public and private 
housing, between 43 and 58 percent of households report to save regularly. More than 60 
percent of households that save do so on a monthly basis. 
 
4.  Estimation Strategy and Findings 
 
We now turn to an empirical analysis of factors that explain why some households are 
successful in moving out of slums while others are not. Our model estimates the 
household’s decision to move out of slums as a function of savings behavior and a set of 
other household and dwelling unit characteristics. The structural equation underlying the 
observed behavior is a decision model where households choose to move, if the benefits 
from moving are higher than the benefits from staying in a slum. This is expressed as 
i i i i i i i i DU H S D e g b a + + ¢ + ¢ =
' *             (1) 
where Di
* is household i’s net benefit from moving, Si represents savings behavior, Hi is a 
vector of household characteristics, DUi is a vector of dwelling unit characteristics that 
influence the household’s decision, and ei is a normally-distributed error term with mean 
zero and variance s. Household characteristics include mother tongue and gender of the 
household head. Mother tongue is a proxy for ethnicity to test whether slum residents of 
the majority Hindi speaking population in Bhopal are significantly more or less likely to   14 
move out of slums than migrants from other parts of the country who tend to speak a 
different language. Life cycle theories of housing demand and savings also suggest 
consideration of household composition (Deaton 1992, Deaton and Paxson 2000). A 
commonly used measure is the household dependency ratio defined as the number of 
non-working household members over those that are employed or self-employed. 
Dwelling unit characteristics include the characteristics of the previous dwelling unit for 
movers and of the current dwelling unit for non-movers, such as availability of an 
individual water source and toilet facility in the dwelling unit and whether the household 
owned their home. 
We do not observe the latent variable Di
* directly. Instead we only observe the 
outcome of the household’s evaluation of (1), which is revealed in the choice made by the 
household to move or stay: 
Di = 1  if Di
* > 0            (2a) 
Di = 0  if Di




We estimate (2a-b) as a probit model, correcting for unspecified heteroskedasticity, using 
data for the 779 households who lived in slums previously or who still resided in a slum 
during the survey period. Summary statistics for all variables are presented in Table 5 and 
Table 6 provides the estimation results.  
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Table 5: Variable summary statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std. dev. 
Household moved out of slum (dependent variable)  0.21  0.41 
Household engages in regular savings  0.13  0.34 
Male head of household  0.55  0.50 
Non Hindi speakers  0.21  0.41 
Dependency ratio (Non-working / working family members)   3.32  2.22 
Head of household is an unskilled worker  0.41  0.49 
Household owned slum dwelling unit  0.58  0.49 
Individual water access in previous home  0.25  0.44 
Source: Bhopal Household Survey 2003  
 
Table 6: Results from econometric analysis 
  1  2  3  4 




2 + head of 
household 
skill level 




Household engages in regular savings  0.173  0.192  0.141  0.129 
  (0.049)**  (0.050)**  (0.049)**  (0.049)** 
Male Head of household    -0.066  -0.072  -0.073 
    (0.030)*  (0.029)*  (0.029)* 
Non Hindi speakers    0.117  0.100  0.090 
    (0.039)**  (0.038)**  (0.036)* 
Dependency ratio    0.006  0.005  0.005 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Head of household is an unskilled worker      -0.130  -0.104 
      (0.028)**  (0.029)** 
Individual water access in previous home        0.137 
        (0.036)** 
Tenure in previous dwelling unit        -0.157 
        (0.030)** 
Observations  779  779  779  779 
Coefficients are marginal effects from probit regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
We present several specifications. In column 1 we use savings behavior as the 
only factor influencing a household’s decision to move out of slums. The variable   16 
identifies households that manage to regularly save a portion of their income either in 
some form of a revolving or chit fund savings scheme or in some other type of saving. 
The estimated parameters show that regular savings are a significant and important 
predictor of a household’s probability of moving out of slums. The estimated marginal 
effect of 0.17 suggests that engaging in regular savings increases a household’s 
probability of moving out of a slum by 17 percent. 
In column 2, we report results for savings behavior after controlling for household 
characteristics, and in column 3 we add the skill level of the head of household. In both 
specifications, saving remains a highly significant explanatory variable for the ability to 
move out of a slum. The skill level variable takes the value of one when the head of 
household is an unskilled worker, relative to a moderately and high skilled worker. 
Households headed by unskilled workers are less likely to move into the formal housing 
market. Results for other household head characteristics suggest that non-Hindi speakers 
are more likely to move out of slums. This variable serves as a proxy for migrants, 
because Bhopal natives tend to be Hindi speakers. A possible reason why migrants do 
better is that they may be more entrepreneurial than native slum dwellers, as reflected by 
their decision to move across cities or regions in search of better opportunities. While we 
can not offer conclusive evidence on why migrants may move out of slums at a higher 
rate, the survey information shows that migrants in the sample have higher educational 
attainment compared to natives, and most have moved to Bhopal in search of 
employment opportunities. Migrants may thus use slums as an initial residence after 
arrival before moving on into the formal housing market. Dependency ratios do not have 
any effect on household mobility in these estimations. Interestingly, male household   17 
heads are less likely to move out of slums, a noteworthy finding given that almost half 
the households in the sample are headed by females. The coefficient is significant 
throughout the specifications. We have no clear explanation for this result. 
In the specification presented in column 4 we consider the possibility that 
households who have moved out of slums have positive unobservable attributes, such as 
innate ability, that distinguish them from households who did not move out. While we do 
not have any direct measure of innate ability, the survey does include information on the 
quality of services that each household received at its initial dwelling unit. The 
underlying intuition of using this information is that households who have higher ability 
would tend to sort themselves into slums with relatively better public services. We use 
two indicators to measure the quality of service delivery – whether the dwelling unit had 
a toilet within the house and whether it had an individual water connection. In the 
empirical examination, we find that both these service measures are highly correlated. 
We therefore only use individual water access in the econometric analysis. These results 
are provided in column 4 of Table 6. The results suggest that households with individual 
water access are about 14 percent more likely to move out of slums compared to other 
slum dwellers. The estimated parameter is statistically significant, which means that 
having individual water access in the previous dwelling unit is strongly associated with 
the probability of moving out of a slum. As before, even after controlling for 
unobservable ability, savings behavior is still positive and significant.  
In the same estimation reported in column 4, we also examine whether the 
household’s prior tenure status has any bearing on its chances of moving out of slums. 
Our hypothesis is that households who own dwellings in slums have already made lumpy   18 
housing expenditures and would incur significant transaction costs in trading or selling 
their properties, as very few have clean titles to their dwelling units. In fact, in our current 
sample of existing slum dwellers, we find that 90 percent of residents in non-notified 
settlements that report owning their dwelling unit have no documentation of ownership. 
For owners living in notified squatter settlements, 83 percent have some type of 
ownership documentation. Of these, 80 percent only have a ‘Patta’, which is a certificate 
of land occupancy for a limited period of time. This suggests that owners of property in 
slum areas, while attaining a certain security of tenure, are unable to capitalize on the 
value of their dwelling in order to trade up into the formal housing market. Uncertain title 
status therefore presents a barrier to mobility. Indeed, our results show that ownership of 
a dwelling unit in a slum reduces the probability of moving out by about 16 percent.  
 
Robustness Tests  
To examine the robustness of the previous set of estimates, we use propensity score 
matching based on the probability of undertaking regular savings to construct a 
comparison group of households who do not save regularly (Leuven and Sianesi 2003). 
Propensity score matching is often use in impact analysis to compare beneficiaries of 
some form of intervention (i.e., program participants) with others who did not receive 
such benefits. Using the two groups, we match households with regular savings with a 
comparison group of households who do not save (i.e., non-participants). One would 
ideally like to match a participant with a non-participant using the entire dimension of 
observable attributes X—i.e., a match occurs if there are two individuals, one in each of   19 
the two samples, for whom the values in X are identical (Jalan and Ravallion 1999). 
However, this is impractical as it would be very difficult to find individuals who match 
on each observable attribute. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that matching can be 
performed instead by conditioning on P(X)—i.e., the “propensity score—alone rather 
than on X, where P(X) = Prob(D=1| X) is the probability of participating conditional on 
X. If outcomes without the intervention are independent of participation given X then they 
are also independent of participation given P(X).  
  We use a standard probit model to calculate the propensity score for each 
observation in the participant and the comparison-group. In addition to the variables used 
to predict housing mobility in Table 6, we also include information on education, job 
security and assets while calculating propensity scores. These are measured as education 
attainment of the household head’s father (whether father has completed primary school), 
agricultural land holdings, and whether or not the household head had a job with the 
government or a public sector organization. People with higher education attainment are 
likely to have a better understanding of the future benefits of savings as they discount 
benefits over a longer horizon. As the household head’s own education attainment is 
likely to be endogenous, we use education attainment of the father of the household head 
as an instrument. Owning agricultural land holdings provides a safety net, increases 
options for consumption smoothing and may thus allow the household to save on a 
regular basis. Finally, having a government or a public sector job is an indication of job 
stability, which increases the potential for regular savings. 
Propensity score results are provided in Table 7. We use a Gaussian kernel 
density estimator and a bandwidth of 0.06, along with bootstrapped standard errors (1000   20 
repetitions). Once we estimate the density for the non-participants, we exclude those non-
participants for whom the estimated density is equal to zero. As reported in Table 8, 
average treatment effects based on kernel matching on the predicted z-score confirm the 
validity of the results of the previous estimates of regular savings impact on housing 
mobility. Households who save regularly are about 11.4 percent more likely to move out 
of a slum. 
 
Table 7: Propensity Score Matching (Savings) 
Variable  Coefficient 
  (standard errors) 
Household head is an unskilled worker  -0.61 
  (4.15)** 
Male head of household  0.115 
  (0.93) 
Non Hindi Speaker  -0.22 
  (1.38) 
Tenure in previous dwelling unit  0.045 
  (0.37) 
Individual water access in previous home  0.331 
  (2.52)* 
Father of household head has primary education  0.16 
  (1.07) 
Household own agriculture property  0.028 
  (0.10) 
Household head has government job  0.731 
  (5.41)** 
Constant  -1.299 
  (9.01)** 
   
Observations  779 
   
Log Likelihood  -266.078 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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Table 8: Propensity Score Estimates for Moving out of Slums: Kernel Matching  
                       
    
Mean of 
matched 
treated    
Mean of 
matched 
controls    
Average 
treatment 
effect    
               
  Moving out of slums  36.19    25.02    11.43   
            (6.81)*   
                       
* Significant at the 0.05% level. Propensity scores estimated as a probit model (Table 7)   
Gaussian Kernel, bandwidth 0.06, bootstrapped standard errors       
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we examined why some people manage to use the informal housing market 
as an intermediate step towards improved housing, while others remain stuck for 
generations. Using household survey data, we investigated the determinants of residential 
mobility in Bhopal, India. Our main finding is that in situations with limited access to 
institutional housing finance in general, and for slum dwellers in particular, the ability of 
households to save regularly significantly improves their chances for moving out of 
slums.  
While service improvements or in situ slum upgrading are welfare improving 
strategies that do not require relocation, the current scale of upgrading activities 
undertaken by governments and donors in most countries is miniscule compared to the 
scale of the problem. As a consequence, mobility out of slums appears to be a valid 
welfare enhancing strategy. In addition to the benefits from improved housing   22 
characteristics, moving out of slums can also have positive impacts on children’s 
education attainment through peer groups and social interaction, reduced exposure to 
crime, and improved referral networks for job searchers.  
These findings confirm the need to confront two important challenges: (a) what 
strategies can be implemented to improve the savings potential of slum dwellers, many of 
whom work in the informal sector and have irregular incomes, and (b) how can financial 
institutions increase outreach so that savings can be complemented by credit based 
financial assistance? The fact that a small but significant share of low income slum 
households manage to save regularly—about 13 percent in our sample for Bhopal—
demonstrates that there is a potential for encouraging wealth accumulation among the 
poor. This can take the form of appropriate savings accounts or credit based mechanisms 
given the demonstrated ability of even poor households to set aside or repay funds on a 
regular basis. Finding adaptable means to support such households represents a public 
policy challenge as well as a business opportunity for private sector financial institutions. 
While we do not aim to provide an overview of strategies that can be used to promote 
savings, it may be useful to consider the potential of financial instruments that are 
flexible in terms of payment amounts and frequency, along with simple deposit and 
withdrawal systems that reduce transaction costs (see also Smets 1999). Public guarantee 
schemes may be required but must be designed to reduce moral hazard both among banks 
and borrowers. Further, given the volatility in incomes and high opportunity cost of time 
for informal sector workers, a door to door collection and servicing system as used in 
many rural-based microfinance models may be particularly useful.  
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